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JANUARY 2020

POLICY BRIEF
College Attainment, Income
Inequality, and Economic Security
A Simulation Exercise
Brad Hershbein, Melissa S. Kearney, and Luke W. Pardue
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n We simulate how earnings
inequality and poverty rates would
change if educational attainment
were to increase.
n The most intense simulation raises
the share of prime-age adults with an
associate degree from about 10 to 20
percent, and with a bachelor’s degree
from about 40 to 60 percent.
n Earnings increase by 5 to
15 percent, but the gains are
concentrated among lower-income
individuals.
n Consequently, the ratio of income
between the top and bottom halves
falls, especially for men.
n Moreover, the fraction of primeage adults living in poverty falls from
11.3 to 8.9 percent.

A
dults in the United States without a college degree have fared relatively poorly in
terms of employment and earnings outcomes over the past four decades. Te college

wage premium—the ratio of earnings of those who have received a bachelor’s degree
to those who have not—increased between 1980 and 2000 and has held steady since,
remaining at roughly 90 percent for both men and women. In addition, prime-age
adults with no more than a high school degree have experienced a sizable decline in
employment rates, both in absolute terms and compared to college-degree holders.
Te divergent economic outcomes of those with and without a college degree have led
many observers to stress the need for increased skill attainment, in particular increased
college attainment, to boost individual economic security and address rising income
inequality. Tis proposal is consistent with the arguments emphasized in the book Te
Race between Education and Technology (Goldin and Katz 2008). In highly simplifed
terms, Goldin and Katz argue that, during the 1980s and 1990s, the demand for collegeeducated workers rose faster than the supply of college-educated workers, leading to a
rise in their relative wage.
We conduct a simulation exercise that gauges the likely impact of increased rates
of college attainment on measures of income inequality and economic insecurity. Te
results reveal that increasing college attainment would shrink gaps between the 90th
percentile and lower half of the earnings distribution, as well as between the median
and bottom, in most cases. Increased college degree attainment would meaningfully
raise economic security for individuals near the bottom of the earnings distribution and
reduce poverty rates. However, increases in college attainment would not reduce gaps
at the very top of the distribution—for instance, the 99/90 percentile ratio. Te policy
prescription of increased educational attainment should thus appeal to those whose
primary concern is the economic security of lower-income individuals, but it will not
satisfy the goals of reduced income shares at the top of the distribution.1

Simulation Approach

For additional details, see the working
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/319.

We measure employment, earnings, income, and poverty status using the same source
the federal government uses for ofcial income and poverty measures, the Annual Social
and Economic Supplement of the Current Population Survey. To illustrate changes in
earnings and inequality over a long horizon, we focus on the 1980 survey (covering
earnings from 1979) and the 2019 survey (covering earnings from 2018). To minimize
concerns about schooling and retirement decisions, we focus on simulating greater
degree attainment for adult civilians of prime age, 25−54. We defne full-time, full-year
This paper builds on a 2015 policy memo that Hershbein and Kearney wrote with Larry Summers and posted on
the Hamilton Project website (Hershbein, Kearney, and Summers 2015).
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Among men age 25−54,
the employment rate fell
from 92 to 85 percent
between 1979 and 2018,
with larger losses for
those without a college
degree.

workers (FTFY) as those usually working at least 35 hours per week and at least 40 weeks
of the year. For earnings, we include annual wages and salaries, as well as (positive)
business income, adjusted for infation to year 2018 dollars. Because poverty status is
based on family rather than individual income, we measure income relative to poverty
thresholds using total family income and ofcial poverty thresholds for the individual’s
family size and type.
We examine four groups: all prime-age FTFY workers, prime-age FTFY men and
women separately, and all prime-age men, regardless of work status. Among the last
group, all men age 25−54, the employment rate fell from 92 to 85 percent between 1979
and 2018, with larger losses for those without a college degree. Partly as a result, earnings
(adjusted for infation) fell for the bottom half; even among FTFY men, earnings for
the bottom half barely budged. At the top, earnings rose substantially for both groups.
Among women, earnings increased for almost everyone, but the gains were much larger
at the higher end of the distribution.
What would increasing educational attainment do to these trends? We simulate
three hypothetical scenarios. Simulation 1 raises the share of the group (for each group
above) with at least a bachelor’s degree (BA share) to 50 percent. Simulation 2 raises
the share of the sample with an associate degree (AA share) to 15 percent and the BA
share to 50 percent. Simulation 3 raises the AA share to 20 percent and the BA share
to 60 percent. Both new AA holders and new BA holders are drawn from the existing
high school graduate population. For each scenario, we assign the “new” AA and BA
holders simulated earnings in two ways. Te distribution method assigns a random draw
from the distribution of existing AA or BA holders (including those with higher than a
BA), within cells defned by age group, race, and sex. For example, under this approach,
suppose a black male 29-year-old with a high school diploma were simulated to have
bachelor’s degree; he would be assigned the earnings from a random draw of an existing
black male 25-to-34-year-old who already has a bachelor’s degree. Te causal parameter
method, on the other hand, assigns a percentage boost to an individual’s existing income,
where the specifc percentage boost comes from studies that estimate the return to
someone just earning an associate or bachelor’s degree: 29 percent for an AA and 68
percent for a BA. (Te working paper provides the underlying studies, as well as full
methodological details of the simulation.) Te distribution method allows an individual
currently out of the workforce to be assigned positive earnings via the simulation and
also accounts for the possibility that diferent people have diferent returns to college. Te
causal parameter, on the other hand, may come closer to capturing the average return for
individuals likely to be afected by a policy to boost educational attainment.
Because an increase in the share of the population with a college degree tends to
lower the college wage premium, all else equal—this law of supply and demand is the
foundation for the Goldin and Katz approach mentioned above—we adjust earnings for
this relative wage. Specifcally, we estimate that a 1 percent increase in the relative supply
of BA to non-BA labor narrows the wage premium by 0.26 percent; analogously, a 1
percent increase in the relative supply of AA to high school graduate labor decreases that
relative wage premium by 0.17 percent. Depending on the simulation, these adjustments
narrow the BA wage premium by between 4 and 11 percent and the AA wage premium
by between 1 and 11 percent.

Impacts on Inequality and Poverty
In 2018, 45 percent of FTFY prime-age workers held at least a BA and 7 percent held
an AA; among all prime-age adults, these numbers were 40 and 11 percent, respectively.
Simulation 1 raises the BA share to 50 percent, a modest increase among FTFY workers,
but a substantial one among all prime-age individuals, requiring that 11.1 million more
adults hold a bachelor’s degree. Simulation 3 is even more demanding, roughly doubling
this number for BAs and adding about 10 million AAs. All three simulations raise
earnings in each of the four samples for roughly the lower three-quarters of the earnings
2
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In 2018, 45 percent of
full-time, year-round
workers held at least a
bachelor’s degree and 7
percent held an associate
degree; the most intense
simulation increases
these shares to 60 and 20
percent.
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distribution, with the strongest gains in the middle. Te highest percentiles, however,
show much smaller gains (or even losses among FTFY men) due to the relative wage
efects that lower the college wage premium.
To understand how distributional outcomes are afected, we compare observed
and simulated percentile earnings ratios for prime-age FTFY men, prime-age FTFY
women, and prime-age men. (For parsimony, we focus here on the third and most
intense simulation.) Each group saw sizable increases in these ratios between 1979 and
2018, particularly between the 90th and lower percentiles, implying that the top were
pulling away from those below them. However, the ratios from the simulations—under
either method—show that increases in college attainment for FTFY men and women
would lead to meaningful reductions in earnings inequality. For example, among FTFY
men, the 90/10 ratio increased from 3.86 to 5.58, implying that in 2018 men at the 90th
percentile earned 5.58 times as much as men at the 10th percentile, up from 3.86 times as
much in 1979. Simulation 3 would bring that ratio down to 5.16 (distribution method) or
5.02 (causal parameter method), reducing the increase in inequality by about one-third.
Among FTFY women, the 90/10 ratio increased from 3.6 to 5.0; simulation 3 would
bring that ratio down to between 4.25 and 4.41, reducing the increase in inequality by
almost half. We also fnd sizable reductions for the 90/25 and 50/25 ratios, although
changes in the 99/90 ratio are slight, as most people in this range already have college
degrees.
For prime-age men, we omit ratios including the 10th percentile (which corresponded
to zero earnings in both 1979 and 2018) and focus on the other ratios, as shown in
Figure 1. As the causal method increases earnings only for those with positive earnings,
the simulated efects on income inequality are smaller at the lower end than those from
the distribution method. Te latter simulation implies the 50/25 ratio, which rose from
1.71 to 2.18 between 1979 and 2018, would fall to 1.89. Te 90/25 ratio, which rose
from 3.33 to 6.00, would fall to 4.83. Te distribution method simulation also shows the
employment rate would rise by 2.8 percentage points, suggesting gains below the 25th
percentile not captured by the displayed ratios.
We also consider how the three simulation scenarios would afect measures of
economic insecurity among prime-age adults, as captured by diferent ranges of income
relative to ofcial poverty thresholds (FPL). We consider the outcomes of deep poverty
(below 50 percent FPL), poverty (below 100 percent FPL), near poverty (below 150
percent FPL), and low-income (below 200 percent FPL). Each of these measures of
poverty increased between 1979 and 2018, with the share of prime-age adults living
below the poverty line increasing from 8.2 to 11.3 percent. Under the distribution
Figure 1 Percentile Earnings Ratios, Prime-Age Men
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NOTE: Figure shows ratios of earnings for men, age 25−54, across diferent percentiles, as measured in 1979 and
2018 and as simulated according to the two methods described in the text. For example, in 2018, a man at the
90th percentile earned six times as much as a man at the 25th percentile, but the simulations reduce this ratio to
4.8 or 5.1.
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Reductions in the
near-poverty or lowincome rate are larger,
with the first falling from
18.5 to 14.2 percent, and
the second from 26.5 to
20.4 percent. Both simulated rates are lower than
their actual levels
in 1979.

Figure 2 Family Income Relative to Poverty Line, Shares of Prime-Age Adults
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NOTE: Figure shows shares of adults, age 25−54, whose family incomes fall below 50, 100, 150, and 200
percent of the federal poverty line, respectively, as measured in 1979 and 2018 and as simulated according
to the two methods described in the text. For example, in 2018, 18.5 percent of adults age 25−54, lived in a
family with income below 150 percent of the federal poverty line

method, the simulated poverty rate falls by 2.4 percentage points, to 8.9 percent.
Reductions in the near-poverty or low-income rate are larger, with the frst falling
from 18.5 to 14.2 percent, and the second from 26.5 to 20.4 percent. Both simulated
rates are lower than their actual levels in 1979. Te rate in deep poverty also falls, but
only modestly, from 5.6 to 5.0 percent, refecting the concentration of deep poverty
among those with less than a high school degree, a group not directly afected by the
simulation. Under the causal parameter method, the reductions are roughly half as large,
a consequence of this method boosting earnings only for those who already work and
not for those who aren’t employed.

Conclusion
We simulate the efects of increasing college attainment, both bachelor’s and associate
degrees, for men and women age 25–54, on earnings and earnings inequality. Our two
diferent approaches yield similar conclusions: increasing the educational attainment
of adults without a college degree will increase their average earnings, with gains
concentrated in the lower half of the earnings distribution. Tese earnings shifs imply
meaningful reductions in rates of poverty and near-poverty, with modest reductions in
upper-lower tail inequality, but little impact at the very top of the distribution.
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